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Disclosure Statutes After McIntyre v Ohio
Elections Commission
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Campaigns for elective office are often won or lost in the
living rooms of America. Candidates wage war over the airwaves,
attacking opponents' beliefs, voting records, or character.' In
response, the majority of states has sought to enrich the quality
of political debate-and perhaps even preserve a shred of civility-by enacting disclosure statutes that require sponsors of
political advertisements to identify themselves on screen.2 Propot BA. 1992, Williams College; J.D. Candidate 1997, The University of Chicago.
1 See generally Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar, Going Negative: How
PoliticalAdvertisements Shrink and Polarize the Electorate 1-16 (Free Press 1995). See
also Larry J. Sabato, The Rise of Political Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections
117 (Basic Books 1981) (Television is voters' primary source of campaign information.).
' Thirty-one states and the federal government have enacted such statutes. See Brief
of Amid Curiae for the States of Tennessee, et al, in Support of Respondent at 1, Appendix 1, McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission, 115 S Ct 1511 (1995) (No 93-986). Alabama,
for example, requires disclosure in television and radio commercials. See Ala Code § 1722A-12 (1995), which provides:
Any paid political advertisement... broadcast on any electronic media shall be
clearly identified or marked as a paid advertisement. It shall be unlawful for any
person, candidate, principal campaign committee or other political committee to
broadcast ... [any] political advertisement, without a notice.., broadcast at the
beginning or end of a radio or television spot, stating that the communication was a
paid advertisement and giving the identification of the person, principal campaign
committee or other political committee that paid for, or otherwise authorized such
communication.
See also Wash Rev Code Ann § 42.17.510(1) (West 1991 & Supp 1996) ("All radio and television political advertising, whether relating to candidates or ballot propositions, shall
include the sponsor's name."). Congress has outlawed anonymous communications in
campaigns for federal office:
Whenever any person makes an expenditure for the purpose of financing communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, or
solicits any contribution through any broadcasting station... such communication-(1) if paid for and authorized by a candidate, an authorized political committee
of a candidate, or its agents, shall clearly state that the communication has been
paid for by such authorized political committee.
2 USC § 441d(a) (1994).
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nents argue that by removing the cloak of anonymity, disclosure
statutes foster accountability, deter false or libelous statements,
and provide voters with information helpful in evaluating an
advertisement's content.3
Yet the constitutionality of these statutes has been cast into
doubt. The Supreme Court, in McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission,4 invalidated a broad provision of the Ohio Elections Code
that banned all anonymous political leafletting s Margaret
McIntyre had challenged her one-hundred-dollar fine for distributing unsigned flyers opposing a proposed local school tax.6
Finding that Ohio's interests did not justify the disclosure
statute's burden on "core political speech," and noting the "honorable tradition" of anonymous political speech in American
history, the Court held that the statute violated the First Amendment.'
McIntyre threatens to cut a broad swath through state
election codes. The ruling "cast[s] doubt on the election laws of
nearly every state" and "appears likely to prompt a new round of
challenges to the disclosure requirements contained in Federal
and numerous state election laws."' But the precise scope of
McIntyre is far from clear. The Court offered little guidance as to
See generally Developments In the Law-Elections, 88 Harv L Rev 1111, 1286-91
(1975) (reviewing history and purposes of state disclosure statutes). Courts have invoked
these and other justifications in upholding disclosure statutes against First Amendment
challenges. See text accompanying notes 45-48.
4 115 S Ct 1511 (1995).
' Ohio Rev Code Ann § 3599.09(A) (Baldwin 1995) provides:
No person shall write... a notice, placard, dodger, advertisement, sample ballot, or
any other form of general publication which is designed to promote the nomination or
election or defeat of a candidate, or to promote the adoption or defeat of any issue, or
to influence the voters in any election... unless there appears on such form of publication in a conspicuous place ...the name and residence or business address of the
chairman, treasurer, or secretary of the organization issuing the same, or the person
who issues, makes, or is responsible therefor.
6 See McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1514.
7 Id at 1518-19, 1524.

' Linda Greenhouse, Justices Allow Unsigned PoliticalFliers, NY Times A20, A20
(Apr 20, 1995). Prior to the Court's ruling, a broad coalition of state and local governments warned that invalidation of Ohio's statute would threaten existing state election
codes. "[T]he invalidation of Ohio's source identification requirement could not only
jeopardize source identification laws in many other States, but could also call into question other election disclosure laws which limit anonymity in campaign contributions,
expenditures, and communications." Brief of the Council of State Governments, et al, as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission, 115 S
Ct 1511 (1995) (No 93-986). The coalition characterized Ohio's law as a garden-variety
campaign disclosure requirement. Id at 25.
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the decision's applicability to statutes that regulate a narrower
class of speakers-such as candidates for public office---or a
communications medium other than print.9 More broadly, the
Court failed to illuminate a clear boundary between permissible
and impermissible state regulation of political speech. After
emphasizing the considerable benefits of anonymous political
speech entering the marketplace, the Court then conceded that "a
State's enforcement interest might justify a more limited identification requirement. . . ."" The dissent accused the majority of
failing to establish a clear rule of law for reviewing disclosure
statutes, predicting that "[ilt may take decades to work out the
shape of this newly expanded right-to-speak-incognito .... "11
The puzzlement of state election officials in the wake of
McIntyre suggests that the dissent's forecast was accurate. State
officials from Pennsylvania to Alaska have openly questioned the
holding's sweep.' Similarly, political commentators have speculated about the decision's applicability to television advertising. 3 And candidates themselves have defied state disclosure
laws, citing McIntyre in their defense.'4 The decision's many

' Notably, the Court did not address § 3599.09(B) of the Ohio Code, which contains a
parallel prohibition of anonymous political speech broadcast on television or radio. See
note 78 and accompanying text.
1 McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1522. Justice Ginsburg, in a concurring opinion, similarly
highlighted her concern that a broad reading of McIntyre might establish a right to
anonymity bordering on the absolute, thereby foreclosing state regulation under any
circumstances: "We do not thereby hold that the State may not in other, larger circumstances, require the speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its identity." Id at 1524
(Ginsburg concurring).
" Id at 1535 (Scalia dissenting).
12 See, for example, Sean Connolly and Peter J. Shelly, Republican staff won't be
charged: Ruling OK's anonymity, Harrisburg Patriot B1 (May 6, 1995) (available in
Westlaw at 1995 WL 5062175) (Pennsylvania Attorney General unsure of decision's scope,
but believes that "[t]he Supreme Court has changed in one fell swoop the way campaigns
work and have worked for years" and questions whether the opinion could extend to
campaign advertisements.); Stan Jones, Alaska weighs ruling:Politicalmessages could be
nameless, Anchorage Daily News C-I, C-3 (Apr 22, 1995) (Chairman of Alaska Public
Offices Commission unsure of decision's applicability to Alaska statute.).
13 See Editorial, Anonymous Electioneering, Wash Post A18, A18 (Apr 24, 1995)
("Justice Scalia is probably correct in predicting decades of litigation testing this ruling.
Will political advertisers in the mass media claim a right to remain anonymous?"). Most
political professionals fear the decision will encourage negative campaigning. The President of the American Association of Political Consultants opined, "I'm a real First Amendment man, but I think they have opened Pandora's box." David Broder, Bungled By the
High Court, Wash Post C7, C7 (May 7, 1995).
" For example, within a month of the Court's decision, a candidate for town supervisor in Palmer, Pennsylvania disregarded a state law prohibiting anonymous political
communication. He told a reporter that McIntyre protected his action. See Dennis Kelly,
Palmer candidate defends political materials, Allentown Morning Call B4, B4 (May 16,
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unresolved questions-reflected in the confusion of those who
administer (and those who are subject to) the laws-indicate that
lower courts will face considerable uncertainty in applying
McIntyre to their own state disclosure statutes. 5
This Comment addresses the decision's applicability to an
important and ubiquitous provision of state election codesdisclosure requirements for televised political advertisements.
The Comment advocates a narrow interpretation of McIntyre and
argues that laws prohibiting anonymous campaign commercials
are not unconstitutional. Section I examines the tension between
First Amendment goals and a state's interest in regulating its
elections, paying particular attention to judicial attempts to
reconcile the two when reviewing disclosure statutes. Section II
discusses and critiques McIntyre and identifies the ambiguities it
leaves for lower courts. Finally, Section III applies McIntyre to
the context of televised speech by political candidates and argues
that this type of speech differs in constitutionally significant
ways from the speech protected by McIntyre. The Comment concludes that state disclosure laws, narrowly tailored to include
only candidates or their agents communicating via broadcast
media, remain constitutional after McIntyre.
I. REGULATING ELECTION-RELATED SPEECH

Election-related speech restrictions pose tough questions
because they implicate conflicting interests. On one side stands
the First Amendment, which has its "fullest and most urgent
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political
office." 6 Courts have consistently recognized the First
1995).
" Two courts have applied McIntyre to disclosure statutes and reached opposite
conclusions. Yet the difference in scope of the contested statutes-one was limited to fund
raising and the other swept in all anonymous advertisements relating to elections and
ballot initiatives-precludes confident prediction about post-McIntyre jurisprudence. The
Second Circuit, in FEC v Survival Education Fund, Inc., 65 F3d 285, 295-98 (2d Cir
1995), upheld a federal law requiring disclosure by groups that solicit contributions even
if the solicitation includes speech about political candidates. The court found that the
state's interest in preventing a contributor from mistakenly donating to a cause he does
not support is sufficient to overcome a First Amendment challenge. Id at 296-97. In
contrast, a Louisiana court of appeals, in State v Moses, 655 S2d 779, 782 (La Ct App
1995), struck down a sweeping state law that prohibited all anonymous communications
relating to candidate elections or ballot propositions. For a discussion of these cases, see
text accompanying notes 68-71.
,' Monitor Patriot Co. v Roy, 401 US 265, 272 (1971). See also Eu v San Francisco
County Democratic Central Committee, 489 US 214, 222-33 (1989) (discussing First
Amendment challenges to election codes).
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Amendment's role in creating and preserving a free and unfettered debate over politics and the qualifications of candidates for
office.' 7 Disclosure statutes impose a burden on the speaker's
First Amendment rights because they regulate the content of his
speech, forcing him to reveal information that he might otherwise
keep hidden. Moreover, courts have appreciated the particular
importance of protecting political speech that criticizes the government. 8 By burdening a type of political communication often
aimed at incumbents, disclosure statutes may frustrate
antigovernment speech.
On the other side of the debate lies the states' interest in
preserving the integrity and reliability of their elections. The
Court has recognized that "as a practical matter, there must be a
substantial regulation of elections if [elections] are to be fair and
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes." 9 State regulation of elections
encompasses not only the physical act of voting (and the associated time, place, and manner restrictions), but also regulation

" See, for example, Mills v Alabama, 384 US 214, 218-19 (1966) (The purpose of the
First Amendment is to protect free discussion of public affairs, including discussions of
individual candidates for office.). See also New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US 254,
270 (1964) (The First Amendment reflects a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.").
1" "Freedom of expression has particular significance with respect to government because '[ilt
is here that the state has a special incentive to repress opposition and often
wields a more effective power of suppression.'" FirstNational Bank of Boston v Bellotti,
435 US 765, 777 n 11 (1978), quoting Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the
FirstAmendment 9 (Random House 1966). See also Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics:
A Perspective on the FirstAmendment and CampaignFinanceReform, 73 Cal L Rev 1045,
1076 (1985) (suggesting that regulation of the political process "might be a context warranting distrust of elected officials," raising the "systematic possibility that legislators will
behave in self- rather than public-interested ways").
"9Storer v Brown, 415 US 724, 729-37 (1974) (reviewing ballot restrictions in California Elections Code). See also Burdick v Takushi, 504 US 428, 434 (1992) ("[W]hen a
state election law provision imposes only 'reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions' upon
the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, 'the State's important regulatory
interests are generally sufficient to justify' the restrictions."), quoting Anderson v
Celebrezze, 460 US 780, 788 (1983). But the Court has underscored that election regulations that burden speech rest on shaky constitutional ground:
Just as a State may take steps to ensure that its governing political institutions and
officials properly discharge public responsibilities and maintain public trust and
confidence, a State has a legitimate interest in upholding the integrity of the electoral process itself. But when a State seeks to uphold that interest by restricting
speech, the limitations on state authority imposed by the First Amendment are manifestly implicated.
Brown v Hartlage,456 US 45, 52 (1982).
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aimed at combating fraud and corruption in the electoral process.
Courts have often found a state's interest in regulating its own
elections sufficient to justify minor restraints on election-related
speech. °
Litigants on each side of a case involving a disclosure statute
can claim their own polestars. Parties seeking to invalidate the
statute point to Talley v California, in which the Court recognized the historic worth of anonymous speech. 21 In contrast, parties seeking to uphold the statute cite Buckley v Valeo, in which
the Court affirmed a state's power to regulate its own elections
by requiring disclosure of campaign contributors. 22 Before considering McIntyre, which attempts to navigate the muddy middle
ground between Talley and Buckley, this Section examines these
two prior cases and then reviews the pre-McIntyre treatment of
disclosure statutes in the lower courts.
A. Talley: The Value of Anonymous Speech
The seminal case reviewing restrictions on anonymous
speech is Talley v California,in which the Court struck down on
First Amendment grounds a Los Angeles city ordinance that required handbills to bear the name and address of the person who
prepared, distributed, or sponsored them.' The plaintiff in
Talley distributed leaflets urging a boycott of certain local merchants. 24 Although the handbills were attributed to "National
Consumers Mobilization," with an address provided, the plaintiff
was charged with violating the ordinance because the leaflets did
not bear the plaintiff's personal name or address. 2 The Court

2

Courts typically review with great deference election regulations that concern the

physical act of voting, such as laws regulating conduct at the polls. See, for example,
Burson v Freeman, 504 US 191, 193-95 (1992) (upholding Tennessee statute prohibiting

political campaigning within one hundred feet of the polls on Election Day). The Court
has also permitted states to prevent "party raiding"-the switching of blocs of voters from
one party to the other in order to manipulate the other party's primary election-on

grounds that the state may prevent distortion of its electoral process. Rosario v
Rockefeller, 410 US 752, 760-62 (1973).
21 362 US 60, 64-65 (1960). See, for example, State v North DakotaEducation Association, 262 NW2d 731, 735-36 (ND 1978) (invoking Talley in striking down disclosure
statute).
424 US 1, 60-84 (1976) (per curiam). See, for example, Minnesota State Ethical

PracticesBoard v NRA, 761 F2d 509, 512 (8th Cir 1985) (invoking Buckley in upholding
disclosure statute).
23 362 US at 65.
24 Id at 61.
' Id. The handbills charged the merchants with carrying products of manufacturers
who discriminated against minorities.
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underscored the value of anonymous speech in enabling a persecuted group to criticize an oppressive majority practice, con-

cluding that "[t]here can be no doubt that [ ] an identification
requirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression." 26 Finally, the Court
hailed what it termed "the most constructive purposes" of anonymous speech, noting that anonymous pamphlets "have played an
important role in the progress of mankind."27
Yet the Court carefully circumscribed its holding. After condemning the breadth of the ordinance, which regulated handbill
distribution in any place and under any circumstance, the Court
suggested that a more narrowly tailored ordinance might have
withstood First Amendment scrutiny: "W]e do not pass on the
validity of an ordinance limited to prevent [fraud, false advertising, libel] or any other supposed evils."28 This caveat suggests
that Talley is best read not as establishing a general right to
anonymous speech, but as reminding state legislatures to tailor
disclosure statutes narrowly to protect specific state interests.
B. Buckley: Minimal Restrictions on Speech Are Permissible
Sixteen years after Talley-and two years after Watergate-the Court upheld a federal statute requiring disclosure of
contributors to campaigns for federal office." In Buckley v Valeo,

25

Id at 64. Although the plaintiff did not allege any specific threats of physical harm

that might result from disclosure, courts have generally been quite sensitive to this
danger. See, for example, NAACP v Patterson, 357 US 449, 462 (1958) (invalidating a
state disclosure statute based on the dangers of "economic reprisal, loss of employment,
threat of physical coercion [or] other manifestations of public hostility").
27 Talley, 362 US at 64-65. The Court noted that Thomas Paine and other Revolutionera writers, including the authors of the Federalist Papers, often wrote anonymously or
under pseudonyms. See id at 62 n 3.
Id at 64.
2 This reading is generally supported by lower courts' interpretations of Talley. See,
for example, People v Duryea, 76 Misc 2d 948, 351 NYS2d 978, 993-97 (NY Sup Ct 1974)
(voiding disclosure statute for overbreadth when the statute was not narrowly drawn to
further the state's interest in preserving the integrity of its campaigns and elections).
30 The statute at issue was the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub L No 92225, 86 Stat 3 (1972), amended by Pub L No 93-443, 88 Stat 1263 (1974), codified as
amended at 2 USC §§ 431 et seq (1976). The statute provided, in part, that federal campaign committees must disclose:
[Tihe full name and mailing address (occupation and the principal place of business,
if any) of each person who has made one or more contributions to or for such committee or candidate... within the calendar year in an aggregate amount or value in
excess of $100, together with the amount and date of such contributions.
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the Court acknowledged that disclosure statutes necessarily curtail free speech: a potential donor may be deterred from making
a contribution (itself a form of speech) if he cannot do so anonymously.8 1 Yet in the Court's judgment, the benefits of such a law
outweighed the costs. The Court found that disclosure furthered
three substantial state interests: informing the electorate, preventing corruption of the political process, and helping detect
violations of campaign finance laws.3 2 The city ordinance invalidated in Talley was distinguishable in that the federal disclosure
requirements at issue in Buckley were more narrowly tailored:
they represented the "least restrictive means" for achieving the
government's interests.3 3
The Buckley Court concluded that slight infringements on
the First Amendment rights of certain speakers, although deterring some potential speakers from speaking at all, nonetheless
served larger First Amendment goals by providing voters with
relevant information about a candidate.3 4 In this sense, the
Court's intent was not to maximize the amount of speech that
enters the public arena. Instead, the Court accepted a slight

2 USC § 434(b)(2). The statute also required private individuals to disclose independent
expenditures made for communications advocating the election or defeat of candidates for
federal office. 2 USC § 434(e). Courts have relied on Buckley to uphold similar state
schemes requiring disclosure of campaign contributors. See, for example, State v Marshall, 633 P2d 227, 236 (Alaska 1981).
"

424 US at 68.

Disclosure of contributors' identities (and the amount of their contributions) helps
voters evaluate candidates and predict their future performance in office. Specifically, disclosure of contributors reveals a candidate's ideological leanings. Politicians recognize that
accepting a contribution from the NRA or a gay rights group, for example, signals to the
electorate that the candidate generally supports (or at least does not oppose) the group's
goals. See id at 66-68. For a general discussion of the influence of money on political
campaigns, see Herbert E. Alexander, FinancingPolitics:Money, Elections, and Political
Reform (Cong Q 4th ed 1992).
Buckley, 424 US at 68.
Disclosure statutes are "a reasonable and minimally restrictive method of furthering First Amendment values by opening the basic processes of our federal election system
to public view." Id at 82. This line of logic was echoed in FirstNational Bank of Boston v
Bellotti, where the Court emphasized the informational interest that disclosure statutes
served by assisting voters in evaluating the arguments placed before them, noting that
"[ildentification of the source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so
that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected."
435 US 765, 792 n 32 (1978). Despite these remarks, the precedential value of Bellotti in
the disclosure-statute context is quite limited, since the constitutionality of such a statute
was not before the Court. See McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1522. This unpleasant reality, however, has not deterred attorneys' talismanic invocations of the decision. See, for example,
Brief of Amici Curiae for the States of Tennessee, et al, in Support of Respondent at 5-6
(cited in note 2) (using Bellotti to support state's interest in helping voters evaluate
political arguments through disclosure requirements).
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reduction
in the total quantity of speech in exchange for a higher
35

quality.

C. Disclosure Statutes in the Lower Courts
Prior to McIntyre, lower courts reached different conclusions
concerning the constitutionality of disclosure statutes. This is not
surprising: state disclosure statutes come in all shapes and
sizes, 36 and unconstitutional overbreadth typically hinges on the
statute's precise wording. Or so the judges claim. A review of the
case law reveals the difficulty of construing Talley and of drawing
principled distinctions between disclosure statutes that are overly
broad and those that are narrowly tailored." This is not to say
that the decisions are arbitrary. Rather, the cases illustrate that
what controls is not the sweep of the statute, but the court's view
of the statute's usefulness in informing voters and in enhancing
the quality of public debate.38
Lower courts that have invalidated disclosure statutes typically have found the state's interest in regulating anonymous
speech insufficient.3 9 These courts often rely on Justice Holmes's
market conception of the First Amendment-that "the best test of

' For a discussion of free speech tradeoffs, see Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an
Economic Perspective, 20 Suffolk U L Rev 1 (1986).
' For an overview of the various state statutes, see Erika King, Comment, Anonymous Campaign Literature and the FirstAmendment, 21 NC Cent L J 144, 148 (1995)
(-The only safe generalization to be made is that the majority of states require disclosure
of the party financing the writing, and very few require disclosure of the author.") (emphasis in original).
' For example, courts have disagreed over whether a disclosure statute limited to
statements concerning candidates for elective office qualifies as sufficiently narrowly tailored. Contrast United States v Insco, 365 F Supp 1308, 1312 (M D Fla 1973) (distinguishing federal disclosure statute from statute in Talley and upholding on grounds that
federal statute only concerns candidates), with People v Bongiorni, 205 Cal App 2d Supp
856, 23 Cal Rptr 565, 565-66 (1962) (holding state statute limited to statements concerning candidates insufficiently distinguishable from statute in Talley and therefore unconstitutional).
' Contrast State v Petersilie, 334 NC 169, 432 SE2d 832, 843 (1993) (Source identification "is required in order for the electorate to determine what weight, if any, should be
given [an] accusation, even if it is true."), with People v White, 116 Ill2d 171, 506 NE2d
1284, 1288 (1987) ("In our opinion, the voters of this State are perfectly capable of assessing the merits of a viewpoint even though the person expressing it does not reveal his
identity.").
' See, for example, White, 506 NE2d at 1287 (concluding that state's interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process "does not.., have any talismanic significance, and its bare invocation cannot serve to uphold the statute"); State v Fulton, 337
S2d 866, 871 (La 1976); State v North Dakota Education Association, 262 NW2d 731, 736
(ND 1978) ("[W]e can sympathize and even agree with the motives of the sponsors [of the
disclosure statute].... But constitutional imperatives must prevail....").
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truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market ....""0 In this sense, the fact that a
communication is anonymous is merely one of many factors to be
considered when evaluating the statement's truth. Accordingly,
voters are free to attach whatever significance they wish to anonymity. Some courts seize the opportunity to praise the sophistication of the electorate: 'coters are not sheep, and it is implausible to suppose that they will ignore the circumstance of anonymity in evaluating the message."4 '
These courts have not denied a state's interest in informing
voters. Rather, they have suggested that this informational interest is not strong enough to justify restrictions on political speech.
The Illinois Supreme Court, for example, downplayed the state's
informational interest and invalidated the state's disclosure statute, noting that "tlhe State's fear that voters might make an illadvised choice does not provide the State with a compelling justification for limiting speech."4 2 Alternatively, some courts do not
deprecate the state's informational interest, but instead indicate
that a disclosure statute is a poor means of furthering it.4" Under this view, the additional information such a statute provides
is marginal at best. Finally, nearly every court that has invalidated a state disclosure statute has invoked Talley in emphasizing the benefits of anonymous political speech."
In contrast, lower courts that have upheld state disclosure
statutes in the face of First Amendment challenges generally

' Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes dissenting). For a good
example of a court that employed the marketplace metaphor, see People v Duryea, 76
Misc 2d 948, 351 NYS2d 978, 996 (NY Sup Ct 1974).
41 White, 506 NE2d at 1288. See also McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1520 n 11, quoting
Duryea, 351 NYS2d at 996:
Don't underestimate the common man. People are intelligent enough to evaluate the
source of an anonymous writing. They can see it is anonymous. They know it is anonymous. They can evaluate its anonymity along with its message, as long as they are
permitted, as they must be, to read that message. And then, once they have done so,
it is for them to decide what is "responsible", what is valuable, and what is truth.
42 White, 506 NE2d at 1288, quoting Brown v Hartlage,456 US 45, 60 (1982). Brown,

however, did not concern a disclosure statute; it involved a candidate charged with
violating a statute prohibiting vote-buying when he pledged not to accept his full salary if
elected. Brown was not cited by the McIntyre Court, so its applicability to this context is
questionable.
See, for example, Duryea, 351 NYS2d at 996 (arguing that voters are capable of
discounting for anonymity).
' See, for example, Fulton, 337 S2d at 867.
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have employed one or more of four overlapping justifications.
First, by discouraging reckless and inaccurate attacks, disclosure
statutes promote the state's interest in ensuring that its elections
are conducted honestly and fairly.45 Second, disclosure statutes
play an important role in informing the electorate by enabling
voters to weigh bias.4 6 This justification recognizes that the
speaker's identity is itself an important component in the total
mix of information confronting the listener-voter. Third, disclosure statutes help candidates refute charges by identifying the
source of an attack. Presumably this qualifies as a state interest
in that effective rebuttal-or the threat of rebuttal-enhances the
overall quality of public debate."' Finally, courts that have upheld disclosure statutes often have taken a dim view of anonymous communications in general. Consider the language of a
Pennsylvania court affirming the constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting anonymous political publications: "[The statute] is
an attempt to raise the ethical standards of political discussion,
to promote fair play and fair competition in politics, to banish
cowards from the political arena, and extirpate the dirty business
of surreptitious character assassination.""
The approaches taken by pre-McIntyre courts generally reflect attempts to balance a state's informational interest, and its
interest in regulating its elections, against speakers' First
Amendment rights. Although the cases typically begin by examining the concrete statutory language at issue, the holdings are
premised on more ethereal considerations-namely, the costs and
benefits of requiring disclosure. Quantifying these costs and benefits is a tough task premised on hazy empirical judgments. Will
forced disclosure chill valuable political speech? How helpful to a
voter is a speaker's identity? And won't disclosure only chill relatively worthless speech, such as personal attacks on an oppo" See, for example, KVUE, Inc. v Moore, 709 F2d 922, 937 (5th Cir 1983) (observing
that Texas disclosure statutes are "generally-applicable and evenhanded regulations that
protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself"), quoting Anderson v
Celebrezze, 460 US 780, 788 n 9 (1983); Morefield v Moore, 540 SW2d 873, 874 (Ky 1976)
(upholding Kentucky statute designed "to promote honesty and fairness in the conduct of
election campaigns").
"6 See, for example, State v Acey, 633 SW2d 306, 307 (Tenn 1982) (Disclosure statutes
"ensure that voters have information which will aid them in assessing the bias, interest,
and credibility of the person or organization disseminating information about political
candidates, and in determining the weight to be given a particular statement.").
"' See Canon v Justice Court, 61 Cal 2d 446, 39 Cal Rptr 228, 231 (1964) (in bank)
(Enabling candidates to refute charges helps ensure that elections are the result of a well
informed public will.).
" Commonwealth v Evans, 156 Pa Super 321, 40 A2d 137, 138-39 (1944).
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nent? The courts' answers to these questions are factored into the
balance and determine whether a statute is unconstitutionally
overbroad. What ostensibly begins as a close analysis of statutory
language dissolves into a pragmatic inquiry, resulting in a predictably wide range of conclusions among the courts.
The pre-McIntyre courts' differing treatment of disclosure
statutes resulted in part from the vast, uncharted middle ground
between Talley and Buckley. Somewhere between the sweeping
Los Angeles ordinance and the minimally restrictive federal statute lay the line between the constitutionally permissible and the
constitutionally impermissible.
II. MCINTYRE: A RECIPE FOR UNCERTAINTY
McIntyre presented the Court with an opportunity to smooth
out the inconsistencies resulting from the lower courts' hesitant
attempts to reconcile Talley and Buckley. But although the Court
spoke decisively in striking down Ohio's disclosure statute, it
failed to articulate its reasoning clearly.49 As a result, the lower
courts will continue to face uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of election-related restraints on speech. The dividing
line between constitutional and unconstitutional remains hazy.
A. McIntyre
Margaret McIntyre was fined one hundred dollars for violating § 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Elections Code by distributing anonymous handbills protesting a proposed school tax levy.5" She
challenged the statute, which prohibited the distribution of political literature that omitted the name and address of the issuing
individual or campaign official,5 ' on First Amendment grounds.

"' In his dissent, Justice Scalia rebuked the majority for the murkiness of its reasoning.
The Court's unprecedented protection for anonymous speech does not even have the
virtue of establishing a clear (albeit erroneous) rule of law.... It may take decades
to work out the shape of this newly expanded right-to-speak-incognito, even in the
elections field. And in other areas, of course, a whole new boutique of wonderful First
Amendment litigation opens its doors.
Id at 1535 (Scalia dissenting).
' Some of the handbills she distributed identified her as the author. Others were attributed only to "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS." The Ohio Elections
Commission did not allege that her handbills were in any way libelous or misleading.
McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1514 & n 2.
" For the text of § 3599.09(A), see note 5.
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She claimed that the First Amendment protected anonymous
speech, that Ohio's statute was not narrowly tailored, and that
the statute did not serve a compelling state interest.5 2 The Ohio
Supreme Court upheld the statute, finding it a "minor requirement" that "neither impacts the content of [the speakers'] message nor significantly burdens their ability to have it disseminated."53 Weighing the state interests in preventing fraud and informing the electorate against the burden placed upon speakers,
the court found § 3599.09(A) a reasonable and nondiscriminatory
election law.'
The United States Supreme Court disagreed. In a majority
opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court found that the
Ohio court had employed too lenient a standard of review.5 Although laws that merely "control the mechanics of the election
process" are properly reviewable under a relatively permissive
balancing test, the same does not apply to laws that constitute a
"regulation of pure speech."5 6 Thus, the Court held, "[wihen a
law burdens core political speech, we apply 'exacting scrutiny,'
and we uphold the restriction only
if it is narrowly tailored to
57
serve an overriding state interest."
52 See Brief of Petitioner at 8-9.

McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission, 67 Ohio St 3d 391, 618 NE2d 152, 155
(1993). The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Ohio Tenth District Court of
Appeals. Only the trial court, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, found the
statute unconstitutional. See id at 152.
Id at 155-56.
McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1518-19. The Ohio court reviewed § 3599.09(A) under the
standard established in Anderson v Celebrezze, 460 US 780, 789 (1983). In that case, the
Court reviewed another election regulation challenged on First Amendment grounds. John
Anderson, an independent presidential candidate, alleged that Ohio's early filing deadline
for presidential candidates placed an unconstitutional burden on his and his supporters'
voting and associational rights. Id at 782. The Court invalidated the regulation and
established a balancing test for reviewing constitutional challenges to state election laws.
Under this test, a court must first determine the character and magnitude of the injury to
the plaintiff's First Amendment rights. The court must then weigh these considerations
against the legitimacy and strength of the state's interests underlying the regulation. Id
at 789.
" McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1518. The Court distinguished § 3599.09(A) from the statutory provisions challenged in Storer v Brown, 415 US 724 (1974) (ballot qualifications for
candidates), and Anderson, 460 US 780 (filing deadlines for presidential candidates).
57 McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1519. One intriguing aspect of the Court's decision is its
failure to challenge seriously the premise that Ohio's disclosure statute was a viewpointneutral restriction on speech, even though common sense suggests that challengers of
popular incumbents might have a greater need for anonymity. In a footnote, the Court
conceded that "[airguably, the disclosure requirement places a more significant burden on
advocates of unpopular causes than on defenders of the status quo. For purposes of our
analysis, however, we assume the statute evenhandedly burdens all speakers who have a
legitimate interest in remaining anonymous." Id at 1518 & n 8. But see Anderson, 460 US
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The Court found Ohio's two asserted interests-preventing
fraud and informing the electorate-insufficient. Other sections of
the Ohio Elections Code already prohibited fraudulent or libelous
statements;58 the disclosure statute was therefore supplementary at best. Moreover, the disclosure statute did not target only
those anonymous statements that were fraudulent or libelous,
but swept all anonymous statements into its ambit. The Court
similarly dismissed Ohio's informational interest. The need to
provide voters with additional relevant information, the Court
reasoned, does not justify requiring a writer to make statements
he would otherwise omit-particularly where, as here, the name
and address of the author are probably meaningless to the recipient.59 Yet the Court's careful language and qualified reasoning-measuring the value of the writer's name to the document's
recipient6°--suggests that under different circumstances, perhaps involving a different class of writers or recipients, the Court
might find a state's informational interest sufficient, and its disclosure statute constitutional.
The Court carefully wove its way through First Amendment
and election law precedent, distinguishing both Talley and
Buckley. Talley was easy: the ordinance at issue there prohibited
anonymous handbilling in any place and under any circumstances, whereas Ohio's statute encompassed only those documents
intended to influence the electoral process.6 ' In distinguishing
Buckley, however, the Court relied on the nature of the regulated
speech itself. Although the federal reporting statute upheld in

at 798 ("A State's claim that it is enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise decisions by restricting the flow of information to them must be viewed with some skepticism."). Indeed, a cynic would question this facial neutrality, finding it unsurprising that
so many state legislatures--composed, after all, of incumbents-have sought to "raise the
level of political debate" by outlawing a type of advertising often aimed at themselves.
" Sections 3599.091 and 3599.092 outlaw general campaign malfeasance, including
false statements about one's opponent or oneself. Ohio Rev Code Ann §§ 3599.0913599.092 (Baldwin 1995).
McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1519-20:
Insofar as the interest in informing the electorate means nothing more than the provision of additional information that may either buttress or undermine the argument
in a document, we think the identity of the speaker is no different from other components of the document's content that the author is free to include or exclude.
"o

Id at 1520.

81

Id at 1517. The Court noted that the Ohio and Los Angeles disclosure laws shared

one infirmity: neither was limited to fraudulent or libelous statements. Id.
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Buckley required disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures, that minor intrusion on First Amendment rights:
[I]s a far cry from compelled self-identification on all election-related writings. A written election-related document-particularly a leaflet-is often a personally crafted
statement of a political viewpoint.... As such, identification
of the author against her will is particularly intrusive; it
reveals unmistakably the content of her thoughts on a controversial issue."
In distinguishing the two disclosure statutes, the Court thus
recognized a higher level of protection for "personal" speech (as
typified by a leaflet) than for "impersonal" speech (as typified by
a campaign contribution) on the basis that the latter reveals far
less about the speaker.
Finally, the Court echoed its language in Talley by highlighting the historical pedigree of anonymous speech. Permitting
anonymous speech, the Court reasoned, not only benefits the
individual by granting him protection from a hostile majority, but
also enriches society by allowing unpopular ideas to enter the
marketplace. Even if unwelcome initially, these ideas may gradually change public attitudes: 'Under our Constitution, anonymous
pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an
honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent."63 In this sense,
anonymity is simply the necessary price of a healthy and unmodified public debate.
Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that since the text of the
Constitution was unclear on this question, "the widespread and
long-accepted practices of the American people are the best indication of what fundamental beliefs it was intended to enshrine."" He pointed out that every state except California has
enacted some form of disclosure statute, the first doing so in
1890.65 Furthermore, Scalia noted the dangers-and the "silliId at 1523.
' Id at 1524. The Court cited, among others, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton,
John Jay, Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Langhorne Clemens (Mark Twain) and William
Sydney Porter (0. Henry) as famous authors who wrote under pseudonyms. Id at 1516-17,
nn 4, 6.
" Id at 1534 (Scalia dissenting). In a concurrence, Justice Thomas concluded that the
phrase "freedom of speech, or of the press," as originally understood, did in fact protect
anonymous political leafletting. Id at 1525 (Thomas concurring).
' Id at 1533 (Scalia dissenting). See also id at 1530 ("At a time when both political
branches of Government and both political parties reflect a popular desire to leave more
decisionmaking authority to the States, today's decision moves in the opposite direction,
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ness'--that result from a generalized right to anonymous speech.
For example, he questioned whether a public-access cable channel could refuse to permit anonymous, masked performances, or
whether a government periodical must abandon its policy of prohibiting anonymous letters to the editor.6 6 But protecting anonymous communication risks more than silliness. Establishing a
broad right to anonymity would eliminate one of the last remaining guarantors of civilized public debate. For those not constrained by their own conscience, public accountability serves as
an excellent deterrent of outrageous or patently offensive
speech-particularly during an election. As Justice Scalia concluded, recognizing all anonymous communication as "traditionally sacrosanct [ ] seems.., a distortion of the past that will lead
to a coarsening of the future.""
Two courts have applied McIntyre to disclosure statutes. But
neither case sheds much light on the likely course of postMcIntyre jurisprudence. In FEC v Survival EducationFund, Inc.,
the Second Circuit upheld a federal law that requires individuals
who finance direct mailings to raise money for political campaigns to disclose their identities within the mailing.68 This decision is unhelpful because the court confined its analysis to state
regulation of political fund raising, explicitly avoiding the thornier question of political advertising.6 9 And in State v Moses, a
Louisiana court deemed McIntyre "sufficient authority" to strike
down a broad state statute that prohibited any person or organization from anonymously disseminating any sort of communication that related to candidates or ballot propositions.7 ° This case
is similarly unhelpful: the court conceded that its own precedent
alone made for an easy decision. 7' Although Survival Education
Fund suggests that McIntyre will not be extended to protect so-

adding to the legacy of inflexible central mandates (irrevocable even by Congress) imposed
by this Court's constitutional jurisprudence.").
' Id at 1535.
6

Id at 1537.

- 65 F3d 285, 295-98 (2d Cir 1995). The challenged statute was the Federal Election
Campaign Act, 2 USC § 441d(a).
69 See Survival Education Fund, 65 F3d at 296 ("Whatever the effect of McIntyre on
the constitutionality of [ ] political advertising (an issue we do not address), the issue
before us is solely whether requiring a disclosure by a group that is soliciting a contribution runs afoul of the First Amendment.").
70 655 S2d 779, 781-82 (La Ct App 1995).

See id ("In view of our own jurisprudence and state constitution, the state interest
required to justify even a limited prohibition on election-related anonymous literature in
71

Louisiana should be much more compelling than that which theoretically the U.S. Supreme Court might have found sufficient. .. ").
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licitation speech by fund raisers, this result is unsurprising given
McIntyre's reaffirmation of Buckley and the importance of identifying campaign contributors. The shape of post-McIntyrejurisprudence remains uncertain.
B. Critique of McIntyre
The majority's opinion left several puzzles for lower courts
seeking to determine the sweep of the holding. Three points in
particular warrant emphasis. First, it is unclear precisely when a
law burdens "core political speech" and when it merely "controls
the mechanics of the electoral process." The distinction is crucial:
laws that burden core political speech trigger the formidable "exacting scrutiny" test and must be narrowly tailored to serve an
overriding state interest." By comparison, laws that regulate
elections remain reviewable under a balancing test.
Clearly, many provisions of state election codes both regulate
the electoral process and burden speech.7 3 It will likely fall to
the lower courts to draw meaningful distinctions among contested regulations in determining the proper standard of review. Although McIntyre offers little guidance as to how to classify election laws, the Court nevertheless indicated that core political
speech encompasses a vast range of speech, including discussion
of governmental affairs, debate over candidates' qualifications,
and speech concerning public issues in general.74 The Court's
broad language suggests that in borderline cases, a disclosure
statute will be reviewed with exacting scrutiny.
Second, even if speech constitutes "core political speech,"
under what circumstances may it be subject to state regulation?
The obvious answer is that it may be regulated to secure a sufficiently compelling state interest, provided that the statute is
narrowly tailored. But this just begs the question: after McIntyre,
is there any state interest strong enough to withstand the withering gaze of exacting scrutiny? The Court's answer borders on

' Justice Scalia referred to this imposing hurdle as "ordinarily the kiss of death." See
McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1535 (Scalia dissenting).
73 For example, many states prohibit judicial candidates from discussing how they
would rule in future cases. See Berger v Supreme Court of Ohio, 598 F Supp 69, 75-76 (S
D Ohio 1984), aff'd without opinion, 861 F2d 719 (6th Cir 1988) (upholding state restrictions on judicial candidate speech).
74 McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1518-19 ("Discussion of public issues and debate on the

qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government
established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to
such political expression.... ."), quoting Buckley, 424 US at 14.
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the cryptic. After condemning the overbreadth of the Ohio statute, the Court conceded that "a State's enforcement interest
might justify a more limited identification requirement. . ..",
Yet the Court failed to elaborate on what might constitute a
sufficient enforcement interest,76 or, for that matter, a sufficiently limited identification requirement.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg sought to limit the
scope of the majority's decision. Agreeing that the Ohio statute
was unconstitutional as applied to Mrs. McIntyre, Ginsburg cautioned: "We do not thereby hold that the State may not in other,
larger circumstances, require the speaker to disclose its interest
by disclosing its identity."71 7 What precisely constitutes these

"other, larger circumstances" remains to be answered by future
courts.
Third, the decision leaves open the degree of First Amendment protection afforded core political speech in other media,
such as broadcast television and radio. The actual holding is
narrowly confined to written communication, and the Court explicitly declined to review the constitutionality of § 3599.09(B) of
the Ohio Elections Code, which prohibits anonymous speech
uttered over the broadcasting facilities of any Ohio radio or television station, since the provision was not at issue in the case.78
Moreover, the Court implied that a state might indeed have a
stronger interest in requiring disclosure for statements broadcast
to the public, as opposed to statements distributed in written form. 9

75 McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1522.

76Preventing fraud or libel would presumably not be sufficient when the state's interests are already secured by other provisions of the election code. See note 58 and accompanying text.
71 Id at 1524 (Ginsburg concurring). Justice Ginsburg praised the Court for
"[a]ppropriately leaving open matters not presented by McIntyre's handbills ... ." Id.
71 McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1514-15 n 3. The provision in question provides:
No person shall utter or cause to be uttered, over the broadcasting facilities of any
radio or television station within this state, any communication which is designed to
promote the nomination or election or defeat of a candidate, or the adoption or defeat
of any issue or to influence the voters in any election, unless the speaker identifies
himself with his name and residence address or unless such communication identifies
the chairman, treasurer, or secretary of the organization responsible for the same
with the name and residence or business address of such officer ....
Ohio Rev Code Ann § 3599.09(B) (Baldwin 1995). The statute permits radio stations not to
broadcast the residence or business address of the officer, as long as it keeps the address
on file and divulges it to any person upon request. Id.
' See McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1516 ("Whatever the motivation may be, at least in the
field of literary endeavor, the interest in having anonymous works enter the marketplace
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But to the extent that the value of anonymous speech lies in
its potential to change majority attitudes, limiting its form to
printed material-and denying it the vast audience reached by
modern broadcast technology-appears a hollow protection at
best. In short, it is difficult to gauge from McIntyre the importance of allowing anonymous statements to enter the marketplace when the context shifts from a print to a broadcast medium.The urgent emphasis on the social benefits of anonymous
speech seems universally applicable to all media, yet the Court's
carefully qualified language undercuts any firm conclusions.
III. REviEWING STATE DIsCLOSURE STATUTES
A broad reading of McIntyre threatens to cut a wide swath
through state election codes. Such a reading should be rejected.
Indeed, the Court openly acknowledged that states may still
regulate political speech, circumscribing the scope of its opinion
by recognizing that "Buckley may permit a more narrowly drawn80
statute" and by condemning Ohio's "blunderbuss approach."
This Section interprets McIntyre in the context of the Court's
prior jurisprudence, arguing that courts should uphold disclosure
statutes provided that the statutes are limited to (a) broadcast
communication and (b) speech by candidates for elective office.
Not only does this type of speech implicate stronger state interests, but the speaker has a weaker claim to First Amendment
protection.
Under the framework offered here, four types of political
communication exist: (1) print speech by private individuals; (2)
broadcast speech by private individuals; (3) print speech by candidates; and (4) broadcast speech by candidates. Anonymous
speakers in the first category are clearly protected under
McIntyre; this Section concludes that McIntyre should not extend
to the fourth. Categories two and three, although not directly
controlled by McIntyre, will likely fall within its sweep. The
Court's recognition of the "honorable tradition" of anonymous
leafletting (suggesting protection of anonymous print speech by
candidates), coupled with its hesitation to force disclosure by
"lone protestors" (suggesting protection of anonymous broadcast
speech by private individuals), indicates McIntyre's applicability

of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry.") (emphasis added).
' Id at 1524.
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to categories two and three. Nonetheless, such a prediction is
inevitably speculative and, as noted above, is hampered by the
many ambiguities in the Court's opinion.8 '
As for category four, there are very sound policy reasons for
prohibiting anonymous broadcast speech by candidates.82 But
disclosure statutes must now be reviewed within the framework
established by the Court, and policy must yield to the First
Amendment. This Comment seeks to halt the application of
McIntyre through constitutional argument, working within the
Court's framework, by drawing a line between categories three
and four.
A. Broadcast Speech: Diluted First Amendment Protections
1. A history of stricter regulation.
A disclosure statute is more likely to survive First Amendment review if it is confined to broadcast communication. Histori-

cally, the Court has applied lighter First Amendment scrutiny to
restrictions on broadcast communication than to restrictions on
print communication." Consider in this light the Court's past
treatment of restrictions on election-related speech in each medium. The Court has upheld an FCC regulation requiring broadcasting stations to allow candidates for federal office reasonable
access on behalf of their candidacy." The Court's willingness to
infringe upon election-related speech in a broadcast context contrasts with its reluctance to uphold similar restrictions on election-related print communication. For example, the Court has
held that a state cannot require a newspaper to provide a political candidate space to reply to criticism previously published in
an editorial."5
81 See Section II.B.

See text accompanying notes 98-107. Again, the prediction that McIntyre will likely
apply to categories two and three is not to say that invalidating those types of disclosure
statutes is necessarily a wise idea.
' See Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 108 (Free Press
1993) ("Under current law, government has little power to regulate the print media,
whereas the Court allows a range of restrictions on broadcasters."), citing FCC v Pacifica
Foundation, 438 US 726 (1978), Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 395 US 367 (1969),
and NationalBroadcasting Co. v United States, 319 US 190 (1943).
CBS, Inc. v FCC, 453 US 367, 396-97 (1981). For a discussion of regulating televised election-related speech, see generally Timothy J. Moran, Format Restrictions on
Televised Political Advertising: Elevating Political Debate Without Suppressing Free
Speech, 67 Ind L J 663 (1992).
' Miami HeraldPublishingCo. v Tornillo, 418 US 241, 244, 256-58 (1974). See also
id at 259 (White concurring) ("A newspaper or magazine is not a public utility subject to
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Commentators and the Court itself have advanced several
theories for this differing treatment. The most common explanation is scarcity: since there are more would-be broadcasters than
available frequencies, government must allocate licenses, and
therefore has a freer hand in regulating the resulting communication."6 Another explanation rests on a "social impact" theory-that broadcast is inherently a more intrusive medium than
print (since children or unsuspecting adults may inadvertently
view offensive material broadcast into their homes).,7 To be
sure, the scarcity rationale is evaporating in light of the expansion of cable television, and disclosure statutes are not aimed at
regulating obscene material. But the Court's precedent clearly
indicates that government stands on far firmer constitutional
ground when regulating broadcast speech. As the Court recently
observed, "[lit is true that our cases have permitted more intrusive regulation of broadcast speakers than of speakers in other
media. ,8
2. Disclosure statutes as a means of self-governance.
In permitting more intrusive regulation of broadcast communication, the Court has invoked a theory of the First Amendment
as a means of self-governance. This conception of freedom of
speech as applied to broadcasting was first articulated by the
Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC, where the Court
recognized citizens' "collective right to have the [broadcast] medi'reasonable' governmental regulation in matters affecting the exercise of journalistic
judgment as to what shall be printed.").
' See, for example, Turner BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v FCC, 114 S Ct 2445, 2457
(1994) ("Although courts and commentators have criticized the scarcity rationale since its
inception, we have declined to question its continuing validity as support for our broadcast jurisprudence, and see no reason to do so here.") (footnotes and citations omitted);
FCC v League of Women Voters, 468 US 364, 377 (1984) ("The fundamental distinguishing
characteristic of the new medium of broadcasting... is that '[b]roadcast frequencies are a
scarce resource [that] must be portioned out among applicants.'"), quoting Columbia
BroadcastingSys., Inc. v DemocraticNatl Comm., 412 US 94, 101 (1973).
87 See, for example, Pacifica, 438 US at 748 (Broadcasting has a "uniquely pervasive
presence in the lives of all Americans."). In addition to the scarcity and social impact rationales, a variety of other theories have been advanced to explain the differing treatments. For a general discussion of these theories, see Sunstein, Democracy and the
Problem ofFree Speech at 108-14 (cited in note 83).
' Turner, 114 S Ct at 2456. See also Pacifica, 438 US at 748 ("[O]f all forms of
communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment
protection."); Red Lion, 395 US at 388 ("Where there are substantially more individuals
who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every
individual to speak, write, or publish.").
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um function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First
Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."89 In this view,
the purpose of the First Amendment is to enrich public debate
and promote informed democratic deliberation." Often the selfgovernance conception collides with the First Amendment's goal
of protecting self-expression. As one commentator summarized
the conflict:
[F]irst amendment protection of speech has a dual function:
it serves not only to ensure that each individual is free to
speak out, but also to enhance the likelihood that the public
can hear all facets of everything that is pertinent to the
decisions it must make. The public's first amendment rights
as hearers
are just as important as their rights as speak9
ers. '

The distinction between citizens' rights as speakers and their
rights as listeners is helpful in considering the purpose of disclosure statutes. A disclosure statute is essentially a "precommitment strategy" 2 -a means by which citizens, acting through
their state legislatures, can determine in advance the process for
choosing their elected officials. In this sense, a disclosure statute
represents the electorate's considered finding that it does not
want to be influenced by anonymous advertisements in reaching
a voting decision. Empirical research suggests that this may be a
wise choice: studies have shown that if a television advertisement
can be made to seem neutral or authoritative, viewers will later
think they got the information from watching the news.9" Disclo-

395 US 367, 389-90, 396 (1969) (upholding fairness doctrine mandating air time for
opposing views).
See Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment is an Absolute, 1961 S Ct Rev
245, 252-57 (outlining the self-governance theory of the First Amendment).
" Joel L. Fleishman, FreedomofSpeech andEqualityofPoliticalOpportunity:The Constitutionality of the FederalElection CampaignAct of 1971, 51 NC L Rev 389, 427 (1973).
' Sunstein describes precommitment strategies as a way for citizens to "overcome
their own short-sightedness or absence of deliberation." See Sunstein, Democracy and the
Problem of Free Speech at 74-75 (cited in note 83). Another example of a precommitment
strategy is the constitutional provision limiting presidents to two terms in office. Id at 74.
Sunstein also classifies the Constitution itself as a precommitment strategy since it
"persistently foreclos[es] choices in individual cases." See id at 75.
" See Thomas B. Rosenstiel, FCC Rule Calls for Election Ads to Name Source, LA
Times A7, A7 (Jan 2, 1992). See also Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Dirty Politics:Deception,
Distraction, and Democracy 230-34 (Oxford 1992) (discussing the different forms these
advertisements take); Michael Pfau and Henry C. Kenski, Attack Politics: Strategy and
Defense xiii (Praeger 1990) (citing studies documenting the effectiveness of "attack ads").
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sure statutes limit self-expression, but facilitate self-governance
by requiring a basic and meaningful piece of information-the
speaker's identity-as the price of entry into the marketplace of
campaign speech. The Court's communications jurisprudence, in
Red Lion and elsewhere, illustrates that the purpose of disclosure
statutes dovetails with the Court's conception of the First
Amendment in a broadcast medium.
Restricting political speech to further self-governance is often
controversial: a common counterargument is that the restrictions
muzzle self-expression.9 4 By prohibiting anonymous speech, disclosure statutes are guilty as charged. But the counterargument
seems less persuasive when applied to candidates who broadcast
campaign commercials. This is because during an election, the
interest in self-governance is arguably at its peak. As the Court
observed in Burdick v Takushi, a case in which it upheld a
state's prohibition of write-in voting, "[a]ttributing to elections a
more generalized expressive function would undermine the ability of states to operate elections fairly and efficiently."" Permitting a candidate to broadcast anonymous speech risks precisely
this. Particularly in the context of an election, self-governance
should not be sacrificed to candidate self-expression.
Finally, disclosure statutes confined to broadcast communication reduce the risk of selective enforcement. The Court has long
recognized the danger of government officials singling out
antigovernment speech.96 Speech criticizing incumbent officials
typically reaches its peak during election seasons, when thousands upon thousands of political messages-including campaign
brochures, fliers, and broadcast advertisements-reach the public. Clearly, not all of this material can be monitored for conformity to disclosure laws, nor (given limited state resources) can
every violation be prosecuted. Accordingly, when partisan political officials serving on state election boards are tasked with monitoring partisan political advertisements, there arises a very real
risk of selective enforcement. Vindictive and opportunistic politicians may pressure the election board into punishing their oppo-

',See, for example, Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U Pa L Rev 1, 26-54
(1991) (discussing chilling effects of government-mandated disclosure).
504 US 428, 438 (1992). See also Garrison v Louisiana, 379 US 64, 74-75 (1964)
("[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of selfgovernment.").
" See note 18 and accompanying text.
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nents---one need look no further than the facts of McIntyre to
recognize this risk."
Confining disclosure statutes to broadcast communication
reduces this risk for two main reasons. First, there are simply far
fewer candidate commercials on television and radio than there
are fliers and leaflets distributed on street corners or mailed to
voters. Second, the distribution points of broadcast communications are centralized: in any state, there exist but a limited number of television and radio stations that air political commercials.
In short, it is far easier to monitor the activities of a limited
number of broadcast stations than to police every street corner
and shopping mall in America. Limiting the regulatory field increases the visibility of any particular regulatory act or omission.
The risk of selective enforcement does not evaporate, but clearly
diminishes, when disclosure statutes are limited to broadcast
communications.
Under the McIntyre framework, any restriction on core political speech must be reviewed with exacting scrutiny. So although
a disclosure statute limited to broadcast communication is more
constitutionally permissible than one that encompasses print, the
statute still needs to rest on something more substantial than a
history of regulation. That is the concern of the next Section.
B. Candidate Speech Is Distinguishable from Other Political
Speech
The overly broad Ohio statute invalidated in McIntyre regulated political speech by all citizens. One way to narrow a disclosure statute is to restrict only the speech of candidates for elective office.98 Such a statute leaves untouched anonymous speech
by private individuals like Mrs. McIntyre, without clearing the
way for candidates to engage in anonymous warfare over the
airwaves. More importantly, statutes confined to candidate
speech are not only backed by a stronger state informational

' A local school district official, who supported the tax proposal, reported Mrs.
McIntyre to the Ohio Elections Commission, which imposed the one-hundred-dollar fine.
McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1514.
98 Candidate speech includes speech not only by the candidate himself and campaign
staffers, but also by state political parties and other groups, such as political action
committees, that act with the campaign's guidance. For a discussion of regulations of
speech by groups that support a candidate but act independently of the campaign, see
generally Mitchell L. Gaynor, Note, Curbing Injurious PAC Support Through 2 U.S.C. §
441d, 35 Hastings L J 869 (1984).
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interest, but also constitute a less severe imposition on the
speaker's First Amendment rights.
1. State informational interests are stronger.
Disclosure statutes that require candidates to identify themselves as the source of a political advertisement serve stronger
state informational interests than the Ohio statute struck down
in McIntyre. The Court rejected Ohio's claim that the name of an
unknown protester on a leaflet would materially enhance a
voter's ability to evaluate the message therein.9 9 This is eminently plausible: the name of a private citizen shrouded in obscurity serves little, if any, informational interest. But where the
speaker is a candidate, his name is far more recognizable to the
general public. Accordingly, the voter's ability to discount for bias
and general credibility is materially enhanced by learning the
source. This increased informational interest-furthering a
voter's evaluation of the speaker's message-represents a fundamental difference between a state's interest in a disclosure statute limited to candidates and the (insufficient) interest alleged by

Ohio.
Candidate disclosure fulfills another informational interest:
it facilitates evaluation of the speaker himself. This interest is
virtually meaningless where the speaker is a private citizen. But
if a candidate is speaking, the state's interest in facilitating public evaluation of the speaker assumes heightened importance."
Consider the difference between political speech by a candidate
urging a vote against his opponent and political speech by a private citizen urging a vote against a ballot initiative. Both speakers are, in a sense, "biased," and their identities are often important components of evaluating their respective messages. But
only when the candidate is speaking does the listener have an
interest in evaluating the speaker. Whereas a ballot question, or
a debate over a pending bill, is a choice among incorporeal public
policies, a candidate election is a different animal entirely: it is a
choice between specific individuals, or more precisely, between

' "[In the case of a handbill written by a private citizen who is not known to the recipient, the name and address of the author adds little, if anything, to the reader's ability
to evaluate the document's message." McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1520.
" The Court has recognized that enhancing the public's knowledge about candidates
for elective office is a valid public interest. See Anderson v Celebrezze, 460 US 780, 796
(1983) (Mnere can be no question about the legitimacy of the State's interest in fostering
informed and educated expressions of the popular will in a general election.").

1236

The University of Chicago Law Review

[63:1211

speakers.'' In this sense, "[tihe source of the charge is as much
at issue as the charge itself";1 2 candidates are vetted in part on
how they conduct their campaigns for office. Indeed, the very fact
that candidates frequently strike their names from negative advertisements.0 . strongly supports the conclusion that a
candidate's name is meaningful to the electorate. Requiring disclosure only when the speaker himself is a candidate thus serves
greater state informational interests than requiring disclosure for
all speakers.
In reviewing disclosure statutes, courts should accordingly
distinguish between the general class of political speech and the
narrow class of candidate speech. This approach is reflected in
several pre-McIntyre decisions by state courts sustaining disclosure statutes regulating speech by or about political candidates.
These courts generally have emphasized that the significance of
the speaker's identity takes on added informational meaning
during an election.' Election-related speech restraints have
often been upheld as a means of preventing fraud or the corruption of the political process.0 5 But in the wake of McIntyre's rejection of Ohio's interest in stemming fraud as a justification for
a disclosure statute (at least when that interest is already ad-

101

The Court has recognized, in other contexts, the difference between political speech

involving candidates and political speech involving ballot questions. For example, the
Court has acknowledged that greater regulation of speech is necessary to prevent fraud
and libel in a candidate election than in a ballot question. Citizens Against Rent Control v
City of Berkeley, 454 US 290, 296-99 (1981).
102 State v Petersilie, 334 NC 169, 432 SE2d 832, 843 (1993).
10 See text accompanying note 116.
104 In each case, the court recognized that disclosure statutes served a greater state
informational interest in an election context. See, for example, State v Acey, 633 SW2d
306, 307 (Tenn 1982) (Disclosure statutes "ensure that voters have information which will
aid them in assessing the bias, interest, and credibility of the person or organization disseminating the information about political candidates, and determining the weight to be
given a particular statement."); Petersilie, 432 SE2d at 842 ("In the context of a campaign
it is necessary for accusers of candidates to identify themselves, even if they speak the
truth, in order for the electorate to be able to assess the accusers' bias and interest.");
Canon v Justice Court, 61 Cal 2d 446, 39 Cal Rptr 228, 235 (1964):
[A]nonymity all too often lends itself, in the context of attacks upon candidates in the
pre-election period, to smears, as a result of which the electorate is deceived. Identification permits confrontation and often makes refutation easier and more effective. It
tends to reduce irresponsibility. It enables the public to appraise the source.
03 First NationalBank of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US 765, 788-89 (1978) ("Preserving

the integrity of the electoral process [and] preventing corruption ... are interests of the
highest importance.").
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dressed by other provisions of the state election code" 6 ), courts
will likely look to the informational interests served by such
statutes. Statutes confined to candidate speech are, like the statute upheld in Buckley, "narrowly limited to those situations
where the information sought has a substantial connection with
the governmental interests sought to be advanced."'
2. The speaker's interests are diminished.
A disclosure statute limited to candidates for public office
imposes a lesser burden on speakers' First Amendment rights
than statutes not so limited. This is so for several reasons, all of
which stem from the speaker's voluntary declaration of candidacy
and pursuit of public office. First, a political candidate's need for
anonymity is far weaker than that of a private citizen. Anonymity has traditionally been a refuge for speakers who fear retaliation for voicing unpopular views. The McIntyre Court's concern
for a speaker's privacy interests echoed earlier decisions, such as
NAACP v Patterson,in which the Court struck down a disclosure
statute based on the dangers of "economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of
public hostility."' 8 Yet this reasoning weakens considerably
when applied to candidates for public office. A candidate-and
particularly a candidate hoping to communicate to thousands via
his commercials-voluntarily presents himself to the electorate
for its evaluation and approval. Courts should treat the very
declaration of candidacy as representing a waiver of any constitutional privacy interests that would otherwise protect his public
communications.
The Court's treatment of libel law is instructive in this context. What constitutes libel depends on whether the "victim"
qualifies as a public figure: by becoming a public figure, one relinquishes a certain degree of protection from critical public
statements.'" Even an unknown political candidate qualifies as
a public figure." In the libel cases, the Court has recognized
McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1520-21.
Buckley, 424 US at 81.
108 NAACP v Patterson, 357 US 449, 462 (1958).
108 See New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 279-83 (1964) (Restricting public
108
107

officials' ability to recover for libel furthers larger First Amendment goals of ensuring
robust public debate.); CurtisPublishingCo. v Butts, 388 US 130, 164 (1967) (Warren concurring) (New York Times standard applies to public figures as well as public officials.).
...See Monitor Patriot Co. v Roy, 401 US 265, 271 (1971) ("[Plublications concerning

candidates must be accorded at least as much protection [from libel suits] under the First
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that minor restrictions on a public figure's legal protections can
promote larger First Amendment goals by preserving a vigorous
and free-flowing debate on issues of public concern. Applied to
the context of a political campaign, a slight curtailment of a
candidate's freedom to communicate anonymously-triggered by
his voluntary quest for public office-similarly furthers the important First Amendment goal of an informed public debate over
his candidacy.
Second, requiring source identification in commercials broadcast to further one's political campaign imposes no additional
burden on the speaker's First Amendment rights. Consider in
this light the reasoning of McIntyre: disclosure of authorship is
"intrusive" because "it reveals unmistakably the content of [the
author's] thoughts on a controversial issue.""' Again, this reasoning rings hollow in a campaign context. The entire purpose of
a campaign is to build support by revealing-indeed, by disseminating as widely as possible-the contents of one's thoughts on
controversial issues. It is hardly "intrusive" to require a candidate to disclose his thoughts on public affairs. It is even less
intrusive to require a candidate to disclose authorship on his own
commercials, which contain only those thoughts that he wishes to
broadcast to the electorate.
Third, the nature of candidate speech differs dramatically
from the speech protected by McIntyre. The Court distinguished
Buckley by stressing the difference between an impersonal campaign contribution and a leaflet that is "often a personally crafted
statement of a political viewpoint."" A campaign commercial is
hardly "personally crafted." Indeed, the contrary is true: political
commercials are typically crafted by committee, often with little

and Fourteenth Amendments as those concerning occupants of public office."). See also
Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323, 342 (1974) ("Those who, by reason of the notoriety
of their achievements or the vigor and success with which they seek the public's attention,
are properly classified as public figures.... .") (emphasis added).
.. McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1523. See also Brown v Socialist Workers '74 Campaign
Committee, 459 US 87, 111-12 (1982) (O'Connor concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Once an individual has openly shown his close ties to the organization by campaigning
for it, disclosure of receipt of expenditures is unlikely to increase the degree of harassment so significantly as to deter the individual from campaigning for the party.").
m" McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1523. Justice Ginsburg in particular focused on the fact that
Mrs. McIntyre acted alone, likening the case to others involving solo protesters. McIntyre,
115 S Ct at 1524 nn 1-2 (Ginsburg concurring), citing City of Ladue v Gilleo, 114 S Ct

2038, 2046-47 (1994) (homeowner displaying small antiwar sign on her own property), and
United States v Grace, 461 US 171, 183 (1983) (lone picketer on public sidewalk outside

Supreme Court building).
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input from the candidate himself."3 Many spots are aired only
after extensive test marketing with focus groups-the very antithesis of personal crafting." Moreover, a candidate's speech
as expressed in a commercial is inherently less "personal," since
he is offering his policy positions expressly to secure public approval. A candidate's privacy interest (at least concerning his
public remarks) is diluted if not entirely absent. Both in content
and in origin, campaign speech thus differs from speech by a
private individual. Candidate speech, like a campaign contribution, is intended purely to advance the campaign. In this sense,
candidate commercials bear a closer relationship to the speech
regulated in Buckley than the speech in McIntyre. Characterizing
a modern campaign commercial as a personally crafted statement
would rob the Court's careful distinction of Buckley of its meaning.
Fourth, and finally, candidates seeking to broadcast anonymous commercials can only hope for a mushy sort of anonymity
at best. This is because expenditure disclosure laws require candidates to report all campaign funds spent on advertising."
Given this information, the press, not to mention the candidate's
opponents, will likely trace the advertisement to its source (assuming it is not readily apparent in the first place).
But even if candidates have little hope or expectation of
preserving anonymity, they may have another hope: severing
identification at the time of communication. When delivering a
particularly harsh or personal attack, candidates consistently
distance themselves from their messages. Consider the advice of
two political consultants:
Keep your candidate out of the piece.... By putting your
candidate in the piece, you may risk associating him or her
with the kind of message that you intend for your opponent.
Moreover, it's always best to have someone else deliver the

.. See Ansolabehere and Iyengar, Going Negative 1, 146, 153-54 (cited in note 1).
14 See, for example, Elizabeth Kolbert, Test-Marketing a President, NY Times Magazine 18, 20 (Aug 30, 1992) (discussing candidates' reliance on focus groups in creating
television commercials). For a general discussion of commercial techniques in political
advertising, see Moran, 67 Ind L J at 666-72 (cited in note 84).
"' See Buckley, 424 US at 60-68 (upholding expenditure disclosure requirements for
federal candidates). Justice Scalia's dissent in McIntyre noted the likely futility of anonymity: "Surely in many if not most cases, [expenditure reporting requirements] will
readily permit identification of the particular message that the would-be-anonymous
campaigner sponsored." McIntyre, 115 S Ct at 1537 (Scalia dissenting).
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negative message, even if it's a third-person,116unsigned piece.
Keep your candidate at a dignified distance.
This suggests that candidates who communicate anonymously
are not motivated by the desire to preserve their personal safety,
but instead by the desire to preserve their popularity with the
electorate. Candidates represent a class of individuals with a
common motivation for desiring anonymity-a motivation inconsistent with the Court's recognized justifications for anonymous
communication. Drawing a distinction between candidate speech
and other political speech offers a workable bright-line rule for
excluding a defined class of speakers from the protection of
McIntyre.
3. No chilling effect on speech.
Disclosure statutes are vulnerable to charges that they produce a chilling effect on speech. This concern was echoed by the
McIntyre Court, which worried that speakers who could not enter
the marketplace anonymously would not enter the marketplace
at all.11 A disclosure statute limited to candidate speech is unlikely to produce this kind of chilling effect. Under this
Comment's proposal, anonymous speech can still enter the marketplace; it just cannot be voiced by candidates for office. Private
individuals can continue to communicate to the public behind a
veil of anonymity. Candidates can continue to exercise their full
constitutional rights to speak or broadcast political messages as
long as they acknowledge authorship. And to the extent that any
candidate speech is chilled, it is likely to be only the most outrageous or offensive attacks-those for which the speaking candidate hopes to dodge accountability. In short, a statute requiring
source identification in campaign commercials, if it alters the
existing incentives at all, will likely improve the tenor of political
debate rather than reduce the total amount of speech about public affairs.

...Richard Schlackman and Jamie "Buster" Douglas, Attack Mail: The Silent Killer,
Campaigns & Elections 25, 67 (July 1995).
"1 "[P]ersecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been
able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all." McIntyre,
115 S Ct at 1516, quoting Talley, 362 US at 64.
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CONCLUSION

State election codes limiting political speech have always
existed in an uneasy harmony with the First Amendment. While
McIntyre confirmed that anonymous political speech is entitled to
First Amendment protection, it failed to delineate clearly the
boundaries of permissible state regulation of election-related
speech. Lower courts and state election boards must continue to
sift through the Court's language, comparing challenged provisions to the statutes reviewed in Talley, Buckley, and now
McIntyre.
This Comment has attempted to provide a general framework for post-McIntyre reviews of state disclosure statutes by
drawing distinctions between types of political speech. Two prominent distinctions are consistent with McIntyre. First, broadcast
speech can be more closely regulated than print speech. Disclosure statutes fulfill the First Amendment goal-recognized in the
Court's communications jurisprudence-of using the broadcast
medium to facilitate self-governance. Second, candidate speech
should be distinguished from other political speech. The state can
claim a stronger informational interest in regulating candidate
speech, and speakers have weaker privacy interests in that context. Under McIntyre's reasoning, broadcast speech by candidates
for public office bears greater similarity to Buckley speech than to
Talley speech-and accordingly lacks any entitlement to anonymity. Courts should therefore uphold state disclosure statutes that
are confined to broadcast communications by political candidates.

